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From Whom No Secrets Are Hid
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
I. Introduction
The title of this contribution to the Charles Alan Wright festschrift is
taken, as some will recognize, from the version of the Collect for Purity
from the Book of Common Prayer used in the Episcopal Church, of which
Professor Wright has been a life-long, devoted member. The title is thus
appropriate personally for Professor Wright. The title is also topically
appropriate because it states epigrammatically the policy of discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is the subject of this Paper.
In the Collect, the Personage from whom no secrets are hid is, of course,
God. The phrase reminds supplicants that the matters under confession are
already known to the Addressee.
The basic policy in the Federal Rules is that this same openness should
apply as between opposing litigants. With certain important exceptions, the
scope of discovery under the Federal Rules is that stated in Rule 26(b)(1):
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... The
information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."'
As stated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,2 "Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation." Such, however, is not the basis of procedural policy
in any other country in the world. In most other countries, the premise is
different and the rules of discovery in civil cases are very different. These
differences constitute a problem for harmonization of the law of procedure
anong jurisdictions with modem law. This Paper examines aspects of that
problem with specific reference to discovery of documents in other
* Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Director, The American Law Institute.
I express appreciation to Aron Izower, University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 1997, and to
Eric Gnmsh, Class of 1998, for great help in documentation of this article.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
2. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3. Id. at 507.
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common-law jurisdictions.4 It also offers an analysis of how the American
rules on the subject have evolved.
II. International "Harmonization" of Procedural Law
The human community of the world lives at closer quarters today than
in ancient days: international trade is at an all time high and steadily
increasing; international investment and monetary flows increase apace;
businesses from the developed countries establish themselves all over the
globe directly or through subsidiaries; business people travel abroad as a
matter of routine; and increasing numbers of ordinary citizens live tempo-
rarily or permanently outside of their native countries. As a consequence,
there are positive and productive interactions among citizens of different
nations in the form of increased commerce and wide possibilities for per-
sonal experience and development. There are also inevitable negative
interactions, however, including increased social friction, legal controversy,
and litigation.
In dealing with these negative consequences, it is recognized that the
costs and misery resulting from legal conflict can be mitigated by reducing
differences in legal systems, whereby the same or similar "rules of the
game" apply no matter where the participants may find themselves.5 The
effort to reduce differences between national legal systems is commonly
referred to as "harmonization. "6 Another term, more often used in other
countries, is "approximation," meaning that the rules of various legal
systems should be reformed in the direction of approximating each other.7
4. In another paper I discuss certain aspects of document discovery directed at targets located in
civil-law jurisdictions. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming May 1998).
5. See Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Community Experience for Developing
Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485, 488-90 (1993) (describing the European
Community as a model of harmonization, from which other economic integration organizations can
learn); see also Larry CatA Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on
the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems, 4 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 185, 186 (1997) (commenting on the trend to compel "all law to 'look alike'").
6. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room-Why Must the
Central European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 23 BROOK. J. INVL
L. 351, 357-59 (1997) (discussing the various characteristics of harmonization and putting different
countries on the same "track").
7. See Backer, supra note 5, at 187 (noting the European use of the term approximation).
Although similar, harmonization and approximation do have different connotations. One commentator
described the difference as follows:
The word "approximation" is rarely used except in the formal language of directives.
The word "harmonization" is used more widely. Strictly speaking, "approximation"
refers to the process of orienting different ... laws and legal processes to a defined
standard. The word "harmonization" is used more broadly to mean simply acting to make
differing conditions more similar to each other.
1666 [Vol. 76:1665
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Most endeavors at harmonization have addressed substantive law, particu-
larly the law governing commercial and financial transactions. There is a
profusion of treaties and conventions governing these subjects, as well as
similar arrangements addressing personal rights such as those of
employees, children, and married women.' A conspicuous example is the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 9
Another example of approximation is a project of The American Law
Institute on Transnational Insolvency. This project aims at approximating
the laws of bankruptcy of the United States, Mexico, and Canada and, in
due course, of other countries as well. 10 Professor Wright is, of course,
President of The American Law Institute and Professor Jay Westbrook of
the University of Texas is Reporter and chief coordinator of the ALI
Transnational Insolvency Project. The ALI Transnational Insolvency is a
procedure project so far as it addresses bankruptcy procedure as well as the
substantive law of insolvency. In this respect the project is nearly unique,
for the international harmonization movement has largely avoided the law
of procedure, particularly attempts at harmonization between common-law
adversarial systems and the civil law judge-centered systems.
Harmonization of the law of procedure is avoided, so it appears, on
the supposition that national procedural systems are too different and too
deeply embedded in local political history and cultural tradition to permit
reduction or reconciliation of differences between legal systems. For
example, UNIDROIT ("International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law"), an institution engaged for more than 70 years in the work of legal
Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive: Transnational Information and Consultation
in the European Union, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 325, 332 n.39 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1148 (recognizing formal international human rights for children, including the child's civil,
political, economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian rights); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, S. TREATY DOc. No. 99-
24 (1986) (adopting a general framework for encouraging foreign investment through nondiscriminatory
treatment); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, openedfor
signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (affirming that women
are entitled to equal participation in social, economic, and political processes); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, S. TREATY DOC, No. 95-2 (1982), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (endorsing the
creation of conditions to insure human rights and freedoms including civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural rights); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (establishing the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes to encourage arbitration and conciliation).
9. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 1.L.M. 605
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
10. See TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF CANADIAN
BANKRUPTCY LAW (A.L.I., Tentative Draft 1997); TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT:
INTERNATIONALSTATEMENTOF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (A.L.I., Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1996);
TRANSNATIONALINSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONALSTATEMENTOF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
LAW (A.L.I., Discussion Draft 1996).
1998] 1667
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harmonization, traditionally has regarded procedural law as beyond its
agenda." There are some international conventions dealing with proce-
dural law-notably The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad 2 and European conventions on recognition of judgments 3-and
effort continues on a more general convention on personal jurisdiction and
recognition of judgments. 4 The international conventions on procedural
law, however, have thus far addressed the front and back ends of proce-
dural law, but not procedure as such. That is, the conventions and draft
conventions govern the bases of personal jurisdiction and the mechanics of
service of process to commence a lawsuit on one end of the litigation pro-
cess and recognition of judgments on the other end. The events in
between-the formulation of claims, the development of evidence, and the
decision procedure-remain matters governed by local national law. 5
International arbitration often is a substitute for adjudication in
national courts. However, the international conventions on arbitration have
the same limited scope as the conventions dealing with international litiga-
tion in judicial forums. Thus, the international conventions on arbitration
specify aspects of commencement in an arbitration proceeding and specify
also the recognition to be accorded an arbitration award, but they say little
or nothing about the procedure in an international arbitration
proceeding.' 6 Rather, the typical stipulation concerning hearing procedure
in international arbitration is that the procedural ground rules shall be as
determined by the neutral arbitrator.'7
Nevertheless, The American Law Institute is now engaged in a project
seeking to take the next step in international harmonization of procedural
law. The project is entitled "Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure" and
is under the direction of Professor Michele Taruffo, of the University of
Pavia, Italy, and myself. Our approach has been to draft proposed
11. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 695-96
(1998) (stating that the early drafts of UNIDROIT concerned the substantive principles involved in
international sales and contract law).
12. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
13. See European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, opened for signature Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229 (entered into force Feb.
1, 1973); European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1998, 28
I.L.M. 620, 629.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 442, 473 (1987) (dealing with requests
for disclosure and obtaining evidence in a foreign state).
15. See, e.g., CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONALLAW,
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 4-14
(trans., April 1997).
16. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
17. See Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International
Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 90 (1995).
1668 [Vol. 76:1665
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procedural rules that a country could adopt for adjudication of private
international controversies that find their way into the ordinary courts of
justice. 8 Perhaps this venture involves fools walking where angels fear to
tread. The project is inspired in part by the model of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, undertaken over a half century ago in pursuance of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934.19 The Federal Rules established a single
procedure to be employed in courts sitting in forty-eight different semi-
sovereign states, each of which had its own procedural law, its own pro-
cedural culture, and its own bar. The Federal Rules thereby accomplished
what many thoughtful observers thought impossible-a single system of
procedure for four dozen different legal communities. If experience with
the Federal Rules proves that it has been possible to establish a single
procedure for litigation in Louisiana (civil-law system), Virginia (common-
law pleading in 1938) and California (code pleading), the ALI project con-
jectures that a procedure for litigation in transactions across national
boundaries is also worth the attempt.
In any event, The American Law Institute, in sponsoring the project
for Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, has assumed that the task of
procedural harmonization has to start sometime.
I. Fundamental Similarities in Procedural Systems
As Professor Taruffo and I have worked our way into international
harmonization of procedural law, we have come to identify fundamental
similarities and differences among procedural systems. Obviously, the
fundamental differences present the difficulties. It is important, however,
not to forget that all modern civil procedural systems have fundamental
similarities. These similarities result from the fact that a procedural system
must respond to several inherent requirements. Recognition of these
requirements makes the task of identifying functional similarities in diverse
legal systems easier, and it simultaneously puts the ways in which proce-
dural systems differ from one another into sharper perspective.
The fundamental similarities among procedural systems can be summa-
rized as follows: (1) standards governing assertion of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction;' (2) specifications for a neutral adjudicator;
2'
18. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 493-94 (1997) (introducing the background and goals of the project).
19. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1994)).
20. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that personal
jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant who has certain minimum contacts with the forum and
where traditional notions of substantial justice and fair play are not offended).
21. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (drawing on American and English common
law to prevent an adjudicatory officer, whose compensation was tied to a defendant's conviction, from
deciding that defendant's fate).
1998] 1669
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(3) procedure for notice to defendant;' (4) rules for formulation of
claims;' I (5) rules governing development of evidence, particularly
evidence beyond that presented by the respective parties through their
autonomous efforts;24 (6) in modern litigation, provisions for expert
testimony;' I (7) rules for deliberation and decision leading to judgment by
the tribunal, and in modern systems for appellate review;' 6 and (8) rules
governing the finality of judgments.' The extent of transnational
similarity, of course, varies from rule to rule.
Of these, the rules of personal jurisdiction, notice, and recognition of
judgments are so similar from one country to another that they have been
susceptible to substantial resolution through international conventions.'
Although the United States is aberrant in having an expansive concept of
"longarm" jurisdiction,29 this difference is one of degree rather than one
of kind.
Similarly, with specification of a neutral adjudicator we can begin with
the realization that all legal systems have rules to assure that a judge or
other adjudicator should be disinterested as between the parties.
30
Accordingly, in transnational litigation reliance generally can be placed on
the local rules maintaining that principle. Similarly, an adjudicative system
by definition requires a principle of finality. The concept of "final"
judgment therefore is also generally recognized, although some legal sys-
tems permit reopening a determination more liberally than other systems.
The corollary concept of mutual recognition of judgments is also univer-
sally accepted.
22. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding that
due process requires notice to be sufficient and given within a reasonable time to allow parties to make
their appearance).
23. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (finding a due process violation when, in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding, charges were added after and on the basis of the attorney's testimony),
amended by 392 U.S. 919 (1968).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
25. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (stating that prior
to finding expert testimony admissible, judges first must assess whether the expert will testify to scien-
tific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in making a factual finding).
26. See FED. R. App. P. 3-12 (governing appeal from judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 54-63
(governing judgment); FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (governing inquiry into jury verdict).
27. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876) (holding that a judgment constitutes
an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same merits and between the same parties).
28. See KESSEDJIAN, supra note 15, at 4-14.
29. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 27-28 (2d ed.
1997) (noting that the Court of Justice of the European Communities requires a much greater degree
of direct contact in order to establish personal jurisdiction than the minimum contacts required in the
United States).
30. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIsES OF GOVERNMENT 127 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner
Publishing Co. 1947) (1690) (asserting that because "it is unreasonable for man to be judges in their
own cases[,]" the imposition of a neutral adjudicator is fundamental to the creation of civil
government).
1670 [Vol. 76:1665
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IV. Rules of Pleading
Beyond this, the rules governing formulation of claims are substan-
tially identical in most legal systems. The pleading requirements in other
common-law systems require that the claimant state the claim with reason-
able particularity as to facts concerning persons, place, time, and sequence
of events involved in the transaction sued on. The ALI Transnational
Rules of Civil Procedure has accordingly adopted that requirement. Our
rule would require the plaintiff to:
[S]tate the facts on which his claim is based [and] the legal rules that
he contends support the claim. The statement of facts shall be in
reasonable detail as to time, place, parties and participants, and
events .... The plaintiff shall attach copies of all documents, such
as contract documents, on which he intends to rely in supporting the
claim.
This pleading rule is essentially similar to the old Code Pleading
requirement that governed in most American states prior to 1938. In this
perspective, the aberrant system is the one prescribed in Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8, in providing the requirements
that a complaint must state, refers mysteriously to a "short and plain
statement of the claim."3" The terms "short and plain" are adjectives, not
nouns, and leave unresolved what kind of statement is to be short and
plain. Moreover, every legal document is a "statement" of some kind, so
that term does not help either.
It is familiar procedural history that the term "facts" was deliberately
avoided in Rule 8 in an attempt to obviate the supposedly pointless disputa-
tions under previous Code Pleading over whether a pleading stated facts
rather than "mere conclusions" or, less commonly, whether it pleaded
"evidence." 33 However, from one viewpoint this attempt to eliminate dis-
putes over sufficiency of the statement of the facts was unsuccessful.
Instead of eliminating dispute over the sufficiency of statements of the
facts, Rule 8 postponed these disputes to resolution after discovery through
motions for summary judgment, disputes over the scope of discovery, dis-
putes over framing a pretrial order, and motions to exclude evidence at
trial.' This postponement in turn empowered a claimant to pursue at
least some measure of discovery before a judicial determination could be
made as to whether the claimant's claim was substantively tenable. The
31. Hazard, Jr. & Taruffo, supra note 18, at 499 (stating Rule 10).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
33. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 3.5, 3.6 (4th ed. 1992); Leland Lock
Tolman, Advisory Committee's Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 A.B.A.
J. 843, 844 (1954).
34. See Moses Lasky, Memorandumfor the Committee on Rule 8, 13 F.R.D. 275,277-79 (1952).
19981 1671
HeinOnline -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  1671 1997-1998
Texas Law Review
postponement of this critical stage was in general helpful to claimants
because it opened an opportunity for discovery prior to showdown.
Although Rule 8 permits a claimant to plead in vacuous terms, ordinarily
plaintiffs in American litigation actually plead with the kind of specificity
required elsewhere in the world. Doing so helps the judge understand what
the case is about, and it incidentally helps the opposing side.
The estimate that Professor Taruffo and I made in the draft ALI
Transnational Rules is that the "fact pleading" rule will operate in
transnational litigation neutrally as between claimants and defendants. The
cost and uncertainties in international litigation caution a claimant against
attempting to prosecute a suit in contemplation of establishing his case
through discovery. Prosecution of a claim in international contexts ordi-
narily is practical only when the claimant already has substantial evidence
to prove some kind of substantively valid claim. Having such evidence
enables a claimant to plead with sufficient particularity to stay in court at
least for that claim and thereby to proceed to the next stage.
So far, so good. It is at the next stage-after initial statements of
claim and defense-that the fundamental differences between procedural
systems are manifested.
V. Fundamental Differences Between Procedural Systems
The fundamental differences in civil procedural systems are, along one
division, differences between the common-law and civil-law systems.
Equally significant differences exist, however, among the common-law
systems. Here, as in the case of the pleading rules, it is the American
system that is aberrant.
The common-law systems all derive from England and include the
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India,
as well as other smaller regimes such as Israel, Singapore, and Bermuda.
The civil-law systems originated on the European continent and include
systems derived more or less from Roman law (the law of the Roman
Empire codified in the Justinian Code)"5 and canon law (the law of the
Roman Catholic Church, itself substantially derived from Roman law).36
The civil-law systems include those of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain
and virtually all other European countries and, in a borrowing or migration
of legal systems, those of Latin America and Japan.
There are many significant differences between common-law and civil-
law systems. First, the judge in civil-law systems rather than the advocates
35. See HANs JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW 4-5 (1951) (recognizing the legal achievements of the
Romans as one of the most basic foundations of modem civil law).
36. See id. at 205.
[Vol. 76:16651672
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in common-law systems, has responsibility for development of the evidence
and exposition of the legal concepts that should govern decision.37
However, there is great variance among civil-law systems in the manner
and degree to which this responsibility is exercised,38 and no doubt vari-
ance among the judges in any given system. In general, however, in the
civil-law systems the final selection of witnesses to be examined and the
examination itself are done by the judge and only indirectly by the
advocates, who nominate the witnesses and who may suggest questions that
should be asked.3 9 Second, civil-law litigation proceeds through a series
of short hearing sessions-sometimes less than an hour each-focused on
development of evidence. 4 The products of this are then consigned to the
case file until an eventual final stage of analysis and decision.4" In
contrast, common-law litigation has one or more preliminary or pretrial
stages, and then a trial at which all the evidence is received consecutively,
including all "live" testimony.4' Third, a civil-law final hearing usually
takes less time than a common-law trial of a similar case. 3 This is partly
due to a difference in the role of judge and advocates, but it also results
from the different character of a common-law trial and a civil-law final
hearing. Fourth, a civil-law judgment in the court of first instance (i.e.,
trial court) is generally subject to a more searching re-examination in the
court of second instance (i.e., appellate court) than a common-law
judgment.' Also, re-examination in the civil-law systems extends to facts
as well as law.4' Fifth, a judge in a civil-law system serves his entire
professional career as a judge, whereas the judges in common-law systems
37. See Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF.
L. REV. 409, 411-12 (1960) (explaining that in the German system the court does not rely on the
parties to bring relevant law forward, and judges play a central role in leading the parties to the
development of their case).
38. Darrell Prescot & Edwin R. Alley, Effective Evidence-Taking Under the Hague Convention,
22 INT'L LAW 939, 952-53 (1988) (describing the judicially led fact finding process in European civil-
law proceedings).
39. See Kaplan, supra note 37, at 412 (noting that under the German system, the court acts as the
principal interrogator and thereby leaves the lawyer with a relatively "meager" role in the selection and
examination of witnesses).
40. See id. at 412.
41. See id. at 412-13 ("The German system relies on the succession of conferences and
prooftakings to show up strength or weakness with reasonable dispatch.").
42. See id. at 419 (arguing that the pretrial structures of the American system are designed to
allow the parties to fully prepare for the "concentrated trial").
43. See id. at 424-25 (contrasting the inordinate delay that occurs in American trial calendars
because relatively few judges serve on the major courts with the German system's large complement
of judges whose numbers can be expanded as necessary).
44. See id. at 413 (stating that "on appeal to the court of second instance from final judgment...
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are almost entirely selected from the ranks of the bar.6 Thus, civil-law
judges lack the experience of having been a lawyer, which may affect their
views.
These are important differences, but not worlds of difference. The
American common-law system, however, has differences from most other
common-law systems that are of equally great if not greater significance.
The American system is unique in many respects. First, jury trial is a
broadly available right in the American federal courts and, more or less to
the same extent, in the state court systems.4 7 No other country routinely
uses juries in civil cases.' Second, the American version of the
adversary system generally affords the advocates far greater latitude in the
form and style of the case's presentation than in other common-law
systems.49 This is in part because of our use of juries. Third, in the
American system, each party, including a winning party, pays his own law-
yer and cannot recover that cost from a losing opponent5 0 This rule has
been changed by statute for specific types of cases but almost invariably in
the direction of allowing recovery of litigation costs only by a successful
plaintiff.5 In most all other countries the winning party, whether plaintiff
or defendant, recovers at least a substantial portion of his litigation
costs.52 Fourth, American rules of discovery give wide latitude for
exploration of potentially relevant evidence. Depositions of parties may be
taken of right under rules such as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and
30, and usually are actually taken in cases likely to go to trial as distinct
from being settled or simply abandoned. The same is true to a lesser
degree of depositions of third party witnesses. 3 In our system, under
46. See id. ("They are career men .... ."); see also John H. Langbein, The German Advantage
in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 851 (1986) ("The distinguishing attribute of the bench
in Germany (and virtually everywhere else in Europe) is that the profession of judging is separate from
the profession of lawyering.").
47. See generally Kaplan, supra note 37, at 419 (describing the jury trial as the "historic
centerpiece of civil procedure"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
48. See STEPHEN GOLDSTEIN, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM AS SEEN BY AN OUTSIDER
3-5 (Institute of Anglo American Law, Clifford-Chance Distinguished Lecture Series) (Mar. 4, 1994)
(characterizing the continued use of juries in civil trials as a technique peculiar to the American
system).
49. See Langbein, supra note 46, at 830-31 (distinguishing the level of control German courts hold
over the requirement of trial and the presentation of facts with the American system's reliance on divid-
ing pretrial from trial).
50. See 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2675 (2d ed. 1987).
51. Id.
52. See generally ALAN J. TOMKINS & THOMAS E. WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES:
PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN AND FEDERAL COURTS (1986); Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1963); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3).
1674 [Vol. 76:1665
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rules such as Federal Rule 34, discovery of documents is effected by sim-
ple demand by the discovering party without court order. Thus, discovery
of documents requires no prior judicial intervention, as it does in all civil-
law systems, nor is the demanding party required to show "good cause,"
as was formerly required under Federal Rule 34 .4 Discovery is not
limited to "relevant" documents but extends to documents whose
production, in the words of Rule 26(b), "appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."55 Fifth, American judges
are selected in a variety of ways in which political affiliation plays an
important part. In most of the other common-law countries, judges are
selected on the basis of professional standards. 6
VI. Discovery of Documents: The American Phenomenon
It is on discovery of documents that this paper now focuses. The
reasons are as follows:
First, discovery through deposition of witnesses, to an important
extent, is subject to an inherent self-limitation. In any given contested
case, ordinarily there are only so many witnesses who could have anything
useful to recount and only so many questions that they can be asked.
Theoretically, there could be a tort committed in the presence of the
audience in an athletic stadium at full capacity. But in the ordinary course
of life the relevant facts to be proved through witnesses will have been
observed by relatively few observers. In contrast, the clues that can be
sifted from a set of documents cannot be predicted without seeing the set
of documents, and there is no inherent limit on the number of documents
in a "set."
Second, discovery of documents in American litigation often is wide-
ranging, with intrusion on the discovered party and expense to both parties.
In high stakes litigation, discovery usually occurs on a massive scale, the
sheer volume of documents going far beyond that produced in civil litiga-
tion in any other country.57 The targets of this document discovery
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note ("Good cause is eliminated [in the 1970
Amendment] because it has furnished an uncertain and erratic protection to the parties from whom
production is sought and is now rendered unnecessary by virtue of the more specific provisions added
to Rule 26(b). .. ").
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
56. See Langbein, supra note 46, at 851-54.
57. See Gerald Walpin, America's Failing Civil Justice System: Can We Learn From Other
Countries?, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 647, 649 (1997) (arguing that the uniquely broad American
discovery practices constitute the majority of American litigation expenses); see also REmATEmENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442 reporters' note 1 (1987) ("No aspect of the extension of the
American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much
friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.").
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regard it as particularly invasive.58 Managerial-level employees in public
and private organizations feel more or less able to hold their own in
deposition interrogation and recognize that everyone has a duty to give
testimony about what he knows. But discovery of the documents goes after
what public and private officials regard as their most private thoughts, such
that this kind of discovery, to them, resembles self-incrimination.59
Discovery of documents is especially sensitive in international litigation.
Put bluntly, the impression of American discovery in most foreign coun-
tries is that of an alien legal regime conducting a warrantless search in
someone else's domestic territory.' The scope the American system
affords to private litigants for compulsory production of documents is
ordinarily afforded in other countries only to prosecutorial criminal
investigations by government agencies.61
Third, document discovery is a surrogate for the more general prob-
lem of "harmonization" of procedural systems between the United States
and the rest of the world. Discovery depositions present less serious
disharmony. Although discovery depositions are more numerous and more
lengthy here than abroad, they are similar to examinations at trial in other
common-law systems and examinations at hearings in civil-law systems.
But document discovery American style is something unto itself.
Finally, in my reading of the historical record, the broad ambit of
discovery of documents in American procedure is not a direct artifact of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as promulgated in 1938. Rule 34 of
the 1938 Rules, in authorizing document discovery, laid the legal founda-
tion for our contemporary system.' However, as I interpret the historical
record, modern American document discovery is a consequence of a
58. See Karen A. Feagle, Extraterritorial Discovery: A Social Contract Perspective, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 297, 299 (1997) (arguing that most other countries consider American discovery
practices a "fishing expedition" and limit the scope of discovery to protect personal privacy).
59. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPEITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 3 (1991) (describing the document demand as the most onerous and intrusive aspect of
discovery).
60. See Feagle, supra note 58, at 299 ("[Mjost other countries do not even recognize the
legitimacy of direct extraterritorial discovery, but instead regard it as a violation of their sovereignty
and territorial integrity."); Vincent Mercier & Drake D. McKenney, Obtaining Evidence in France for
Use in United States Litigation, 2 TuLANE J. INT'L & COMp. L. 91, 93 (1994) ("[M]any civil law
countries consider American discovery practices to be encroachments upon their internal security and
judicial sovereignty.").
61. See Walpin, supra note 57, at 649-50 (noting that in Britain and Israel document production
in civil cases is controlled by what the producing party deems to be relevant, while in Australia civil
discovery is severely restricted to what is "necessary" to prevent "fishing" for evidence).
62. For an admirable historical analysis of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, see Stephen N.
Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules,
39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998). This paper was also delivered at a conference on discovery held by the
Advisory Committee. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules I (Sept. 4, 1997) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
[Vol. 76:16651676
HeinOnline -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  1676 1997-1998
From Whom No Secrets Are Hid
complicated evolution that drew force from several important legal
developments not directly associated with discovery as such. The outcome
of this evolution can be displayed by contrasting the present American rules
governing discovery with the counterpart rules in the other principal
common-law jurisdictions-England, Canada, and Australia.
VII. Document Production in Other Common-Law Systems
The rules for document production in the other common-law systems
all derive from English law, particularly those established under the
English Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.63 (Those rules were in turn
a basis for the counterpart provisions of the 1938 Federal Rules.) The
interpretation that is given in modem litigation to the English Rules in
other common-law countries is nominally as broad as the modem American
formulation. 4 Thus, as in our sister common-law countries, discovery
was and is allowed of documents that "may" lead to relevant evidence.'
However, although the same verbal formulation continues to be employed
both in this country and in our sister common-law countries, the operative
meanings of the terms "may" and "relevant" are quite different.
The Rules of the Supreme Court in England promulgated under the
Judicature Acts provided that discoverable documents are those "relating
to matters in question."66 On its face, this standard could be read to
require that documents sought in discovery must be directly relevant to a
stated cause of action. However, the English courts interpreted the stan-
dard in a formulation that is a forebear of Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules.
In 1882 the standard for discovery was held in the leading Compagnie
Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co.67 decision
to cover any document that
relates to the matters in question in the action, which not only would
be evidence upon any issue, but also which, it is reasonable to
suppose, contains information which may-not which must-either
directly or indirectly enable the party... either to advance his own
case or to damage the case of his adversary .... [A] document can
63. See 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2201 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that modem American discovery rules were
originally patterned, in part, after the English Judicature Acts); BERNARD C. CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN
CIVIL PROCEDURE 348 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that discovery procedures in other common-law jurisdic-
tions are derived from the nineteenth century judicature reforms in England).
64. See STEPHEN CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 143 (2d ed. 1997)
(explaining that for discovery in the U.K., "[a] document will be relevant if it contains information
which may advance one party's cause, or damage the other's, or lead to a train of enquiry which may
have either of those consequences").
65. See id. at 142.
66. R.S.C. 0.24, r.l.
67. 11 Q.B.D. 55 (Eng. C.A. 1882).
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properly be said to contain information which may enable the party
requiring the affidavit either to advance his own case or to damage
the case of his adversary, if it is a document which may fairly lead
him to a train of inquiry, which may have either of these two
consequences. 68
The court recognized that it was not applying a plain reading of the
language of the rule. In his opinion, Lord Justice Brett stated:
We desire to make the rule as large as we can with due regard to
propriety; and therefore I desire to give as large an interpretation as
I can to the words of the rule, "a document relating to any matter in
question in the action." I think it obvious. . . that the documents to
be produced are not confined to those, which would be evidence
either to prove or to disprove any matter in question in the action
69
This broad reading of the standard for discovery of documents still
applies in England and has been embraced as well in Australia and
Canada.70
Hence, the rules concerning scope for discovery of documents in the
other leading common-law countries are framed in terms essentially similar
to Rule 26(b) in this country. Yet very different and much narrower mean-
ing evidently is given to the scope rule in other common-law countries.
How does one account for the difference in the meaning that is given to
essentially the same verbal terms?
An important part of the explanation requires reference to the English
rules of pleading. Prior to the adoption of the Judicature Acts of 1873 and
1875, the pleading system in England "was too technical and it led to cases
being decided on narrow points of pleading rather than on merits." 7 The
Judicature Acts set out the basis for the pleading practice that now obtains
in England, Australia, and Canada.' Order 18, rule 7 of the English
Rules of the Supreme Court states that "every pleading must contain, and
contain only, a statement ... of the material facts on which the party
68. Id. at 61 (emphasis in original). The court was interpreting Order XXXI, rle 12 from the
1875 Rules of Supreme Court, which required production of documents "relating to any matters in
question in the action." Id. at 63.
69. Id. at 62.
70. Compagnie Financiere is good law in all three jurisdictions. See Dynamic Control Sys. v.
Newnes Mach. Ltd. 100 F.T.R. 154, 157 (1995) (quoting Compagnie Financiere as a good statement
of Canadian discovery rules); DAVID BARNARD & MARK HOUGHTON, THE NEW CIVIL COURT IN
AcTION 209 n.25 (1993) (citing Compagnie Financiere as authority for the types of documents English
courts require); BERNARD C. CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 320 (3d ed. 1992) (paraphrasing
Compagnie Financiere as the statement of modem Australian law).
71. CAIRNS, supra note 70, at 89.
72. Id. at 91.
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pleading relies .... I7 The term "material facts" has been interpreted
as those allegations "necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete
cause of action; and if any one 'material' fact is omitted, the statement of
claim is bad; it is 'demurrable' in the old phraseology, and in the new is
liable to be 'struck out'. . . ."' If a party fails to plead a material fact,
that party will be prevented from giving any evidence on the fact at
trial.7' Furthermore, the pleadings must contain a "statement of
particulars"76 sufficient to put the defendant on notice as to the case he
has to meet.77  The pleading party must give "particulars of any
misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust ... or undue influence on which
the party pleading relies .... ",78 Additionally, the party must state
whether he is relying on the mental condition of any party and what that
condition is.7 9 The rules further provide that when the pleading party
alleges that the other party had notice or knowledge of a fact, the pleading
party may be required by the court to serve particulars of notice or
knowledge.'
These requirements of specificity in pleading limit the scope of
document discovery. This has been noticed by commentators in the
common-law systems. Cairns says that
[w]hen the pleadings define the ambit of the dispute, they also limit
the scope of what must be given as particulars as well as the scope
of discovery of documents and interrogatories. This comes about
because particulars and discovery and interrogatories must be
relevant to the issues, which are raised by the pleadings."'
In effect, therefore, in the other principal common-law countries the
pleadings define the universe of relevance within which the discovery rules
operate. In employing the conventional analogy to a "fishing expedition,"
an Australian jurist stated "that a person who has no evidence that fish of
a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the
purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not."' In Canada
73. R.S.C. 0.18, r.7(1).
74. Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd., 1 K.B. 697, 712 (Eng. C.A. 1936).
75. See West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, 2 K.B. 391, 399 (1905) (rejecting the
proposition "that it is sufficient to allege what may be a ground of action if something else be added
which is not stated").
76. R.S.C. 0.18, r.12(1).
77. See Bruce, 1 All E.R. at 294.
78. R.S.C. 0.18, r.12(1)(a).
79. R.S.C. 0.18, r.12(1)(b).
80. R.S.C. 0.18, r.12(4).
81. CAiRNs, supra note 70, at 102.
82. Hooker Corp. v. Australia, (1985) 80 F.L.R. 94, 104 (Kelly, J.) (quoting Associated
Dominions Assurance Soc'y Pty. v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1952) 72 N.S.W.W.N. 250, 254
(Owen, J.).
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(at least in Ontario), if a pleading fails to disclose the required detail of
material fact, the opposing party can move to strike the pleading.' One
judge has stated that:
Perhaps the best test of a well and properly drawn pleading is this,
that a stranger to the proceeding, reasonably versed in legal
terminology, might pick up the document and upon first reading
readily ascertain the particulars of the cause of action, the specific
nature of the defendant's alleged breach of duty or other deficiency,
the precise nature of the remedy sought and the reason why such
remedy is, in fact, sought. Unless all of this information is patently
and readily available on the face of the record, then, it seems to me,
the pleading is, itself, defective.'
A second effective limitation on the scope of document discovery in
the other common-law countries is apparently an artifact of the mechanics
in the procedure for document production. In the other common-law
countries, the description of documents to be produced is made in the
general rubric of the rule embodying the "may be related" standarda
Also in those countries, the time for disclosure is much more limited,
implying a much narrower scope of disclosure.a Thus, in England docu-
ment lists are exchanged simultaneously by the parties fourteen days after
the close of pleadings.' In Australia's federal courts, the demanding
party makes a general demand and the responding party thereupon pro-
duces documents whose production the responding party considers to be
required.' In Canada, some provinces follow the English practice, i.e.,
simultaneous disclosure at a specified time after close of the pleadings,
while others follow the Australian practice. 9
83. See Copland v. Commodore Bus. Machs. Ltd. [1985] 52 O.R.2d 586, 589 (explaining that
a minimum level of material fact must be set forth in the pleading to withstand a motion to strike the
pleading as irregular).
84. Mazzeo v. City of Kingston, No. 8979/95, 1996 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1989, at *7-*8 (Ont. Ct.
Gen. Div. May 8, 1996) (quoting Touche Ross Ltd. v. McCardle [1987] Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 257, 258
(P.E.I.) (McQuaid, J.)).
85. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
86. See CROMIE, supra note 64, at 107-08, 143-44 (noting that as compared to the United States,
discovery in common-law countries occurs further into the proceedings, and courts typically oppose
pre-action discovery).
87. R.S.C. 0.24, r.2(1) ("[lEach party must, within 14 days after the pleadings in the action are
deemed to be closed as between him and any other party, make and serve on that other party a list of
the documents which are or have been in his possession, custody or power relating to any matter in
question between them in the action.").
88. Federal Court Rules, 0.15, r.2 (Austl.) (requiring the responding party to file a list of docu-
ments relating to any matter in question between the respondent and the party giving notice of
discovery).
89. See Teresa M Dufort, Canada, in PRE-TRiAL AND PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE
215, 216 (Charles Platto ed., 1990) [hereinafter PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE] (explaining that civil-law
matters are governed by the individual provinces, and therefore some follow the simultaneous disclosure
practice while others require the responding party to disclose all relevant documents).
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In the other common-law countries, as in American procedure, the
responding party is responsible for applying the discovery standard to the
documents in that party's possession or control.' Such an allocation of
responsibility to the responding party is inevitable under any discovery
system short of giving the discovering party direct access to all of the
respondent's documents and allowing the discovering party to choose
among them. However, only in our system is the discovering party
empowered to define the documents that are to be produced. Under
American procedure as formulated in the Federal Rules, the description of
the documents to be produced is made by the discovering party in his docu-
ments demand. The key term in Federal Rule 34(a) is "designated" docu-
ments and this is done by the demanding party.91 In contrast, in the other
common-law countries the designation is made by the discovery rule itself
in terms of documents that "may be related."' Thus, in the other
common-law jurisdictions the discovering party is not allowed to
particularize or intensify the specification. It would appear that, in our
sister common-law countries, the combination of specific pleading, the
short time limit imposed for document production, and the definition of the
obligation to produce set forth in the general rule results in considerably
narrower response in the way of document production than that to which
we have become accustomed in this country.
A final factor resulting in narrower document discovery in common-
law jurisdictions abroad is ineffable but no doubt very real and probably
of greater practical significance. This factor is the general culture of the
bench and the bar in other countries and their orientation to disclosure and
to litigation-what the Germans might call the professional Weltanschauung
and what the French might call the legal profession's mentalitg. It is my
impression that lawyers in other common-law countries, for plaintiffs as
well as defendants, believe that a civil case should not be commenced
90. In Australia, "[a] party therefore has an obligation to disclose, by way of a description in a
list of documents, all documents in its 'possession, custody and power' relating to any matter in issue
in the proceedings." Peter J. Perry, Australia, in PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE, supra note 89, at 3, 6.
In Canada, "a party to an action in any province will be required to disclose the existence of all
documents relating to any matter in issue in the action that are or have been in the possession or control
of the party . . . ." Dufort, supra note 89, at 215-16. The statute governing civil procedure in
England "provides that 14 days after the close of pleading each party must send to the other a list of
documents 'which are or have been in his possession, custody or power relating to any matter in
question between them in the action.'" Peter Leaver & Jeremy Carver, England, in PROCEDURES
WORLDWIDE, supra note 89, at 76, 91 (quoting R.S.C. 0.24, r.2).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) ("Any party may serve on any other party a request. . . to produce
and permit the party making the request ... to inspect and copy, any designated documents. .. ").
92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; supra notes 87, 89; see also GEORG A. WITrUHN,
PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY IN CANADA: INTERNATIONALLITIGATION IN CANADIAN AND GERMAN FORUMS
17, 17-20 (1989) (describing the scope of discovery in Canada, which allows discovery of all docu-
ments "relating to the matter at issue in the action").
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unless the claimant has among his own resources-in testimony, documents
and other proof-enough to establish a prima facie case without obtaining
any further evidence from the defendant. In contrast, the outlook in this
country is that a case can legitimately be prosecuted if the claimant's
lawyer reasonably supposes that a case can be established through use of
discovery. This outlook was manifested in the debates over Federal Rule
11 concerning the standard of investigation prior to bringing suit and is
manifested in pending debates over proposals to amend Rule 26(b) to
require that the discovery material, including documents, be relevant not
merely to the "subject matter" of the litigation but more precisely to the
claims and defenses presented.93
In contrast to common-law jurisdictions, a word is sufficient about
document discovery under the civil-law systems. There is none. Under
the civil law, a party has a right only to request the court to require the
opposing party to produce a document. This arrangement is a corollary to
the general principle in the civil-law system that the court, rather than the
parties, is in charge of the development of evidence. Moreover, in some
civil-law systems, a party cannot be compelled to produce a document that
will establish liability against him-something like a civil equivalent of our
privilege against self-incrimination. However, in some civil-law systems,
a party may be compelled to produce a document when the judge concludes
that the document is the only evidence concerning the point of issue. This
result can also be accomplished by holding that the burden of proof as to
the issue shall rest with the party having possession of the document.
Whether on request of a party or on the court's own initiative, however,
the standard for production under the civil law appears uniformly to be
"relevance" in a fairly strict sense. That is, the court will require a party
to involuntarily produce a document only when the court can see that the
document will be probative on a fact issue identified by the court.
Documents that are suggestively relevant, or relevant only in cumulative
effect, do not meet this standard. The mentalitg of the bench in civil-law
systems thus is perhaps stricter still than that in common-law countries
other than the United States.
VIII. The American Experience
Upon the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, one would have
expected the practice concerning document discovery to evolve
93. See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, Monograph of the Committee on Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, The Deletion of the "Subject Matter" Phrase From Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1) (Aug. 1997) (on file with the Texas Law Review). This monograph was presented
September 1997 at a conference on discovery held by the Advisory Committee at Boston College
School of Law. See Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 62.
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approximately as it has in our sister common-law jurisdictions. The
original Rule 34 authorized production of documents for discovery as
follows:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending
may... order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying ... of any designated documents... not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action .... 94
The drafters of the 1938 Rules, thus, certainly did not foresee the
extent of modem document discovery. For one thing, in their discussions
of the scope of discovery the commentators evidently assumed that the
significant expansion of discovery was in the procedure for deposition
discovery, not in the document discovery. They also assumed that the
ethical standards of the profession would prevent discovery abuse.95
Professor William W. Dawson, in his remarks to members of the American
Bar Association, saw the scope of Rule 34 as analogous to the practice in
England.' He said:
You have to know of the document in order to request it, and know
that it is in the custody of the opposite party. Now, if you do not
have such information, then the custody of the document may be
learned on deposition, under Rule 26 or perhaps by the filing of an
interrogatory. That would then lay the foundation for the application
of Rule 34 or of a subpoena duces tecum in either the deposition or
at the trial of the case.'
Other drafters shared this interpretation of the 1938 Rules. Professor
Edson Sunderland saw document discovery as flowing from information
revealed during depositions. He said:
If one does not know what documents exist and needs such
information to enable him to apply for an order for their discovery,
94. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTIrUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 74, 75 (William W.
Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND] (emphasis added).
95. Hon. William D. Mitchell, Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee in
Recent Months-Commencement ofActions-Effect of Findings of Fact in Cases Tried by Court Instead
of Jury, Etc., 23 A.B.A. J. 966, 969 (1937) (suggesting a strengthening of disbarment or disciplinary
procedures as a means of curbing abuse of federal discovery procedure).
96. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 102 (Edward H.
Hammond ed., 1939) (comparing Rule 34 to the practice in England because Rule 34 "provides a short
cut when the existence and the custody of the document are known").
97. Id. (emphasis in original).
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either an oral examination or written interrogatories may be
employed, since Rule 26(b)... permits such discovery regarding
the existence, description .... and location of documents or things
which are relevant to the case.... [A] preliminary discovery
examination as to the existence and location of documents may be
employed against a party or a mere witness, and after the location
and custody has been discovered, an order of the court may be
obtained directed to a party for inspecting, copying or photographing
the document.98
William D. Mitchell, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, felt
that the Committee had "fortified the provisions for protection against
improper examinations and fishing expeditions."19 Mr. Mitchell noted
that Judge Finch of the New York Court of Appeals had warned that the
discovery rules would lead to an increase in strike suits, but dismissed this
concern by stating:
It may be that in large metropolitan areas like New York City where
the conditions are admittedly bad and many dishonest actions are
brought in the courts, the rules relating to discovery and examination
before trial offer opportunities to lawyers of low ethical standards.
As applied to the country as a whole, we think the rules relating to
these subjects are in line with modem enlightened thought on the
subject and will not be subjected to abuse. 100
These interpretations of what was intended and expectations as to how
the federal system for discovery of documents would work did not portend
the kind of document discovery we now have. Hence, it is not quite accu-
rate to say that "equity" (meaning equity as of 1938) "conque[red]" law
so far as document discovery is concerned.' 01 On the contrary, the
expectation of the draftsmen evidently was that Rule 34 would operate
essentially as the rules of document discovery had operated in the other
common-law jurisdictions.
The American pathway, however, took a different direction.
Essentially, there has been a gradual but sweeping transformation in
American jurisprudence as to the right of a party claiming injury to obtain
documents from alleged wrongdoers that may illuminate the course of
98. CLEVELAND, supra note 94, at 288 (quoting the remarks of Professor Edson R. Sunderland).
99. Mitchell, supra note 95, at 969. It is interesting to note that Mitchell mentions the
Committee's rejection of the idea of allowing a party to demand that the other party produce a list of
relevant documents. See id. This feature is still part of the discovery process in Australia, England,
and Canada. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
100. Mitchell, supra note 95, at 969.
101. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1987) (proffering that "an historical
examination... reveals that the rules of equity prevailed over common-law procedure").
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action leading up to the injury. The immediate transformation occurred
within the law of procedure. However, the change was consonant with,
and reinforced by, more pervasive social and legal change in the same
general direction.
A. Changes in Procedural Law
The most important change in procedural law was in the rules of
pleading. Mr. Moses Lasky, a leading trial lawyer, observed long ago that
the problem was not with the language of the federal pleading requirement
in Rule 8, but rather with the interpretation of Rule 8 pronounced by the
courts."° Here, the key decision by the Supreme Court was Conley v.
Gibson.
10 3
Prior to the line of lower court cases that culminated in Conley v.
Gibson, it was quite possible to interpret Rule 8's requirement of a "short
and plain" statement to require, in essence, a detailed narrative in ordinary
language-one setting forth all elements of a claim under applicable sub-
stantive law. That is, the key would have been not that the complaint was
to be above all "short," but that it was to be above all "plain" and showing
entitlement to relief as a matter of law. Conley v. Gibson turned Rule 8
on its head by holding that a claim is insufficient only if the insufficiency
appears from the pleading itself.' ° Under that interpretation, a pleading
is insufficient only if the pleader "pleads himself out of court."'0° Literal
compliance with Conley v. Gibson could consist simply of giving the names
of the plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for judgment. Another form
of compliance is found in the long rhetorical recitals and denunciations that
have come to characterize much modern pleading.
The significance of Conley v. Gibson on the scope of discovery is
evident. If a claimant can proceed to discovery without any legally rele-
vant allegations at all, then the plaintiff's pleading sets no standard of
relevance to control the scope of discovery. Since discovery extends under
Rule 26 to anything "relevant to the subject matter,"' ° relevance must
be ascertained by some other mechanism. The only effective alternative
is discovery itself. Hence, under Conley v. Gibson, an opposing party and
the court can ascertain the limits on what is being sought in discovery only
by ascertaining what is being sought in discovery.
102. See Lasky, supra note 34, at 276 ("What is needed is to end the improper application of Rule
8.").
103. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
104. See id. at 45-46 ("[W]e follow... the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
105. Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992).
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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Of course, plaintiffs do not generally approach document discovery in
such an unconstrained way. Rather, they have some ideas of what they
want, derived from substantive law, and make demands guided by those
ideas. The effective constraint on scope is not the law of procedure, but
rather the prudence of plaintiff's counsel to avoid processing low-grade
yield from broadly inclusive demands.
The practical consequences of Conley v. Gibson on document discov-
ery have since been ratified by revision of Rule 34. As originally drafted,
the rule required court approval and a showing of "good cause" to obtain
documents." °  As amended, these requirements were omitted on the
ground that they had become needless formalities because courts had come
to grant discovery requests as a matter of routine.' Hence, Rule 34
now provides that "[a] party may serve on any other party a request...
to produce... any designated documents. . .,.""
Other changes in procedural law greatly enhanced the impact of the
change in pleading and discovery effected in Conley v. Gibson. These
included changes in the scope of jury trials, the composition of the jury,
and the formulation and application of the summary judgment rule. These
procedural changes are represented by the decisions in Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover,"' Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.," and Arnstein v.
Porter."' The theme and substance of these decisions is that a jury's
sense of justice, rather than the judiciary's, should be used in assessing a
party's conduct. There is, of course, no necessary connection between a
broad definition of jury trial and broad rights of discovery. However, it
seems plausible that a layman's concept of justice-the concept of justice
expressed by a jury-involves "letting it all hang out" and that this too is
the underlying rationale for comprehensive discovery.
The decisions concerning the right of jury trial, composition of the
jury, and scope of jury authority are familiar. As of 1938, and prior to
Beacon Theatres, the right to a jury trial in federal court extended to
actions seeking remedies afforded under the traditional common-law actions
or under statutes patterned on those actions."' Correlatively, the right
to jury trial did not extend to "suits in equity," in which judges decided
issues of fact." 4 Equity had a broad jurisdiction, including any case in
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note on 1970 amendment, subdivision (a).
108. See id.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
110. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
111. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
112. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
113. See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2302, at 17 (2d ed. 1994).
114. See JOHN J. COUND Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 917-18 (7th ed. 1997).
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which an injunctive or other equitable remedy was sought along with a
legal claim. Equity jurisdiction included, notably, all stockholder deriva-
tive actions, taxpayer and citizen suits seeking an injunction, and suits in
which a claim was made for specific performance, or cancellation, or
revision of a contract. 1 5  Moreover, under the rule in American Life
Insurance Co. v. Stewart,"6 equity's jurisdiction also reached suits com-
menced as actions for damages in which an equitable claim was asserted
by way of a counterclaim." 7 Equity's jurisdiction also extended to
various types of claims for monetary relief or return of specific property
if the claims could be cast in the mold of classical ethical remedies-as
many of them could."' In addition, equity's jurisdiction could plausibly
have been held to extend to claims for declaratory relief, which could be
regarded as a form of equitable relief quia timet. "9 Since at least the
middle of the nineteenth century, there had been a wide "gray area" in
which a claimant could elect whether to sue in law or in equity.
20
Additionally, another wide area existed when an action originally "at law"
would be remanded to equity because an equitable claim had been inter-
jected into the action, as in American Life Insurance.2 1 Moreover, a
plausible argument could have been made that many other types of cases
were "equitable in nature." The procedural devices of free joinder of
claims and discovery were the creatures of equity jurisdiction and were
unknown at common law." Accordingly, it could be said that any case
employing those procedural devices "partook" of equity and therefore was
outside the scope of the jury trial right.
All of this received lore and procedural possibility concerning the
broad scope of equity, and therefore the correspondingly broad scope of a
judge's authority to decide fact issues, was turned upside down in Beacon
Theatres. That case can be understood as reversing the "default rule" for
allocation of authority as between the "law side" of the court, acting
through a jury, and the "equity side," acting through the judge alone."
115. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CML PROCEDURE 649 (4th ed. 1996).
116. 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
117. See id. at 215-16.
118. See YEAZELL, supra note 115, at 649 ("A given plaintiff had to show that the traditional legal
remedy of money damages was inadequate and that he otherwise qualified for equitable relief.").
119. See JAMES, JR., supra note 33, § 8.11, at 446.
120. See YEAZELL, supra note 115, at 650 ("As time went on, distinctions between the two
jurisdictions blurred even further .... ).
121. See American Life Insurance, 300 U.S. at 215; YEAZELL, supra note 115, at 666.
122. See JAMES, JR., supra note 33, § 9.1, at 464.
123. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) (explaining that the
enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules requires a re-examination of the
availability of some equitable remedies and of "the justification of equity's deciding legal issues once
it obtains jurisdiction").
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The default rule prior to Beacon Theatres was that all issues of fact could
be tried by the judge without a jury, except issues subsumed in an action
consisting solely of a distinctively common-law claim. 24 The default
rule announced in Beacon Theatres was that all issues of fact are to be tried
by a jury except issues subsumed under a distinctively equitable claim."Z
Moreover, the Beacon Theatres court observed that claims falling within
the latter category were difficult to imagine, an observation that amounted
to an instruction to lower court judges that they should be unlikely to
encounter such issues in the future." Beacon Theatres thus established
a position no less radical than that expressed in the previous anti-jury
decisional lines, but in the opposite direction: All claims in which the
remedy was monetary compensation, or which could otherwise be assimi-
lated to a claim at common law, were held to be within the realm of trial
by jury. Subsequent decisions extended Beacon Theatres to these logical
conclusions. "
The transformation of the jury itself accompanied the expanded scope
of the jury trial pronounced in Beacon Theatres. The key decision here
was Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co."2 As revealed in the Court's opinion
in that case, a previously prevalent method of jury selection in federal
court was the "key man" system. 29 Under this system, the court clerk
summoned citizens regarded as upright and responsible, and also sum-
moned other veniremen identified by that kind of citizen.'
Consequently, the typical jury consisted of white, male, middle-class
persons of substance or at least steady employment. Some states took a
step farther in authorizing a "blue ribbon" jury in serious criminal cases,
a jury defined in terms of educational attainments that ordinarily would
correlate with middle-class, socio-economic status.'3 I Common sense and
sociological analysis would suggest that juries constituted through the "key
124. See id. at 505.
125. See id. at 510-11 ("[A] long-standing principle of equity dictates that only under the most
imperative circumstances .. . can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior
determination of equitable claims.").
126. See id. at 511.
127. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1970) (finding the plaintiff entitled to a jury
when the relief sought is money damages and the allegations are breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, and gross negligence); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476-79 (1962) (holding
that Beacon Theatres requires a jury trial when plaintiffs claim money damages and trademark
infringement).
128. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
129. See id. at 221-25.
130. See id.
131. See Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35 IoWA L. REV. 409, 409-11,
415-16 & n.32 (1950) (describing "blue ribbon" jury statutes that condition eligibility for jury duty on,
inter alia, property ownership, intelligence, education, and good character).
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man" procedures would have an outlook and value system more likely to
resemble that of typical judges than would a jury drawn from the general
population. The result of using juries so constituted would, of course,
narrow whatever gap might exist between assessment of conflicting
evidence made by such a jury and an assessment made by a judge. Hence,
the change in composition of the jury resulted in changing the practical
significance of the enlarged scope of jury trial under the rule in Beacon
Theatres. The transformation of the composition of the jury is now
validated by legislation.'
Contemporaneous with Thiel's expansion of the jury pool, Arnstein v.
Porter contracted the scope of summary judgment.' The Supreme
Court, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., ratified the thrust of Arnstein's
discussion of the curtailment of summary judgment: The counterpart of the
province of jury trial is the province of a court to grant summary
judgment.'35 The adjacency of these concepts is now recognized in the
terminology of Rule 56, referring to "judgment as a matter of law."
136
The same concept, however, had been expressed in the Federal Rules
beginning in 1938 in the concept of "genuine issue of material fact."37
An "issue of fact" is what a jury decides in cases that are jury-triable,
which under Beacon Theatres was almost any kind of case. A "genuine"
issue of fact is an issue upon which, under the evidence available, reason-
able minds could differ. Whether reasonable minds could differ in light of
the evidence available is itself a legal question for the judge. 38 Thus, the
key question under summary judgment procedure is whether, in the avail-
able proofs, there is an evidentiary conflict sufficient to preclude the judge
from awarding judgment upon motion.
The significance of Arnstein is its holding: Little evidentiary conflict
is required to create a "genuine issue of material fact. " 19 According to
familiar summary judgment doctrine, the judge must view all inferences
and presumptions regarding witness credibility and the evidence in the light
132. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (1968) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869, 1871 (1994)); see generally Cynthia A. Williams, Note, Jury
Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 590 (1990)
(discussing Congress's passage of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 139-42.
134. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
135. Id. at 159 & nn.18 & 20 (explaining the purpose to the 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e) as
restricting the ability of a party opposing summary judgment to create a dispute regarding a genuine
issue of fact through a contrary allegation in his pleading alone).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160 (stating that the party moving for summary judgment has
the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact).
139. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946).
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most favorable to the nonmovant-the party against whom the motion is
made."4  The facts in Arnstein, combined with this fundamental
summary judgment doctrine, demonstrate the relatively low threshold
required to create a "genuine issue of fact." The testimony of plaintiff
Arnstein appeared to any rational observer to be incredible on its face.
The music that plaintiff Arnstein composed did not sound at all like that of
defendant Cole Porter, as indeed a jury eventually found. 4 However,
the Second Circuit held that only the jury could decide such an issue; the
court would not be allowed to anticipate or speculate about the jury's
interpretation. 4 2
A corollary, compatible if not necessary, is that a party must have an
adequate opportunity to pursue discovery in search of evidence sufficient
to meet this standard. That procedural doctrine remains established
today. 1
43
B. Operative Meaning of "Admissible Evidence" Under Rule 26
The aggregate effect of this evolution in decisional law is a change in
the operative meaning of the term "admissible evidence" under Rule 26's
formula, "may lead to . . . admissible evidence. " '" Putting aside the
special problems of the protections accorded by the rules of privilege,45
the aggregate effect is as follows.
First, Beacon Theatres establishes that the trier of fact in federal
litigation is the jury, except when the parties decide to waive their right to
a jury trial."4 Hence, the operative meaning of "admissible evidence"
is evidence that could be regarded ("may be") as admissible before a jury.
Apart from privilege and problems of cumulative evidence, the key concept
under Beacon Theatres is not whether a judge would suppose the evidence
to be relevant-the question posed in our sister common-law jurisdictions
that do not use juries. Rather, the question is whether a judge thinks that
140. See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 63, § 2727, at 121-28.
141. See Arnstein v. Porter, 158 F.2d 795, 795 (2d Cir. 1946).
142. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 470-72.
143. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that adequate time
for discovery is required in summary judgment cases).
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
145. Rules of privilege exclude evidence that may be material, often very material. Hence, the
deinition of a privilege is a critical limitation on discovery. Compare, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-97 (1981) (rejecting a narrow construction of the attorney-client privilege
as inconsistent with "'the principles of the common law as ... interpreted ... in light of reason and
experience'" (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)), with Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-75 (1979)
(denying the expansion of the First Amendmentprivilege in libel actions taken against editors to include
the thoughts, opinions, and conclusions of a publisher).
146. See Beacon Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501, 510-11 (1959).
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as a trial judge, he could permit a jury to consider the evidence on the
basis of relevance. Thus, the question is transformed from a first-person
inquiry ("Do I think the evidence is relevant?") into an inquiry once
removed ("Do I think a jury should be able to consider the evidence under
the standard of relevancy?").
Second, under Thiel, the jury now consists of a cross-section of the
population rather than a group of "respectable citizens." 47 Hence, such
a cross-section is the reference point in responding to the question of
whether a jury could consider the evidence under the relevancy standard.
A cross-sectional jury does not have the same orientation to the world-the
same "take" on life's experiences-as a jury of "respectable citizens."
Every politician and every marketing executive knows this, and such is the
premise of the Thiel decision, subsequent judicial decisions, and legislation
implementing the cross-section requirement."4 It is such a jury whose
"rationality" or "reasonableness" must be predicated in considering rele-
vance and sufficiency of evidence.
Third, the standard for granting or denying summary judgment, pro-
nounced in Arnstein and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., prohibits the court
from making a first-person decision as to whether there is a genuine issue
of fact. The court does not ask itself whether a judge would properly be
able to find for the party against whom the summary judgment motion has
been made. Instead, it must ask whether a jury (specifically, a cross-
sectional jury) would properly be able to make such a finding.
These legal standards operate in conjunction with other legal
standards, some of which have been long established and others of which
are necessary incidents of a discovery system in conjunction with a jury
system. Chief among these other standards is that the province of the jury
extends not only to "historical" issues concerning what occurred in fact but
also to normative issues concerning the issue of right and wrong. 4 9
Hence, the question of admissibility must contemplate normative implica-
tions of potential evidence-its possible effect of giving color or meaning
to the circumstances beyond establishing historical fact. A second impor-
tant standard is that the evidence presented at trial must be considered as
a whole, not item by item. Hence, the question of admissibility must
contemplate the reinforcing effect of one item of evidence on another, and
not focus on an item of evidence in isolation. Third, a jury trial
147. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 225 (1946) (holding that because an
impartial jury is one drawn from a cross-section of the community, class distinctions should not be used
to exclude prospective jurors); supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
148. See Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220, 223-24.
149. See Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1873) (observing the
power of the jury to decide issues of negligence and due care).
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concentrates all proofs of all issues into a single, continuous hearing.
Hence, the question at the discovery stage is whether the material sought
is relevant to any issue that may still be in the case when it goes to the
jury. Fourth, this assessment of discovery material must be made in
advance of trial, usually long in advance. The longer the range of the
prediction, the greater the possibility for error in exclusion. The prudent
course for a judge (who ordinarily does not bear the cost of discovery that
is more extensive rather than less) is to allow the discovery rather than to
deny it. After all, allowing evidence to be obtained in discovery does not
mean that the evidence thereby becomes admissible.
Considering all of these standards and rules, the operative meaning of
Rule 26 is as follows: Evidentiary material, specifically documents, is
subject to production when the responding party considers it too costly to
dispute whether a cross-sectional jury would be allowed to consider the
relevance of the material in light of all of the evidence that might even-
tually be admitted at trial, according to a judge-monitored layman's sense
of justice as regards historical facts and the normative judgments juries are
permitted to make under the rubric of "issues of fact."
This standard means that very few secrets may be hid.
C. Changes in the Larger Legal Context
The changes in procedural law outlined above have legitimated the
broad discovery permitted in the American system, particularly document
discovery, which is the most expensive and troublesome. But these
changes have been effectuated in a larger context that supports this result
and thereby ratifies it on a broader basis. Discussing this larger context in
detail would carry us far afield, so a sketch will do.
I have in mind many kinds of changes. The following are illustrative.
First, the Freedom of Information Act 50 requires, in principle if it does
not always result in fact, that all government transactions, except for
matters of national security and like sensitivity, be open to public
inspection.' Second, the federal public meetings laws that prohibit
private meetings of government officials engaged in deliberations and
decisions have counterparts at the state level. Appropriately called
"government in the sunshine" legislation, they collectively now govern
most agencies of government, state and local as well as federal.'
150. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1994)).
151. Id. at § 522(a)-(b).
152. See Government in the Sunshine Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994); see also, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 1 IA 1/2 (1996) (requiring open meetings of governmental bodies but without
reference to national security).
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Third, administrative law often requires that all interested parties have an
opportunity to submit evidence and argument, and, up to a point, to see the
submissions to an agency that have been made by other interested
parties. 5 3 Fourth, statutes such as the securities laws and the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 '1 require significant
disclosures, including financial information about publicly held
corporations 55 and business mergers,'56 respectively. Fifth, the civil
investigative demands statutes give the Justice Department sweeping sub-
poena powers in antitrust, RICO, and false claims investigations."
Sixth, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19778 requires accuracy and
completeness in corporate financial records. 9 And seventh, there are
pervasive and apparently ever-increasing "required records" regulations,
concerning, for example, environmental risks and employment
practices. 60
This list could easily continue, but one final example may illustrate the
extent of this environment of openness and disclosure. That example may
be found in the emerging requirement in corporate law that the board of
directors of publicly held corporations consist primarily of independent
directors, combined with the longer-established requirement that there be
an audit committee. 6' This combination subjects the once-intimate inter-
nal affairs of public corporations to ever greater external scrutiny.
153. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that inter-
ested parties must have an opportunity to comment on proposed rules, and that a record of comments
made by interested parties to an agency must be made available to the public).
154. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1384 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994)).
155. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (prohibiting misstatements and
omissions of material facts in securities registration statements); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
§ 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994) (prohibiting misstatements and omissions of material facts in an inter-
state offer or sale of securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996) (prohibiting untrue statements of
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of any security).
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (requiring merging parties in a civil antitrust investigation to supply
public notification and to observe a waiting period before completing the merger).
157. See id. (antitrust); 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (racketeering); 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (false claims); see also
Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury, 47 VAND. L. REv. 573, 587 (1994)
(calling subpoena power vested in civil agencies "widespread").
158. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
159. Id. § 78o(d) (requiring all corporations with registered securities to keep "books, records,
and accounts" accurately and with "reasonable detail").
160. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-30-18 (1997) (requiring the retention of records by operators of
hazardous waste facilities); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1776 (West 1989) (requiring the retention of employee
information by certain contractors of the government); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/8 (West 1996)
(requiring the retention of employee wage and hour records by employers); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7309(c) (West 1993) (requiring the retention of employee chemical exposure records by employers).
161. See Principles of Corporate Governance:Analysis and Recommendations, 1 A.L.I. §§ 3.05,
3A.01 (1994) (suggesting the creation of an audit committee in public corporations whose members
have no other significant relationship with the corporation).
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IX. Conclusion
In the foregoing light, it would be a mistake to consider broad docu-
ment discovery as an isolated legal development, let alone a "sport" in
American law. Rather, the American approach to discovery has been con-
secrated by judicial decisions, notably decisions of the Supreme Court,
over approximately half a century, and by express or implied legislative
approval, or at least acquiescence. Broad discovery is thus not a mere
procedural rule. Rather it has become, at least for our era, a procedural
institution perhaps of virtually constitutional foundation.
The essence of this procedural institution is that, when litigation
eventuates, no secrets shall be hid. This institution is quite different from
the view prevailing elsewhere in the world. A question in the future of
"harmonization" of procedural law is the direction of movement between
the American view and that held by others.
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